This paper resolves three empirical puzzles in outsourcing by formalizing the adaptation cost of long-term performance contracts. Side-trading with a new partner alongside a longterm contract (to exploit an adaptation-requiring investment) is usually less effective than switching to the new partner when the contract expires. So long-term contracts that prevent holdup of speciÞc investments may induce holdup of adaptation investments. Contract length therefore trades off speciÞc and adaptation investments. Length should increase with the importance and speciÞcity of self-investments, and decrease with the importance of adaptation investments for which side-trading is ineffective. My general model also shows how optimal length falls with cross-investments and wasteful investments.
Introduction
so it causes IBM to underinvest. The long-term contract serves to protect IBM's investment against holdup by Þxing the price Amex pays for the basic trade. Lengthening the contract raises IBM's incentives by increasing the duration of this protection.
The long-term contract can also protect IBM-speciÞc investments by Amex. For instance, when Amex learns to make better use of the basic IT from IBM, the contract prevents IBM from holding up Amex by raising the trade price. In general, long-term contracts protect speciÞc investments that raise the investor's own payoff from the basic trade. These are called "self-investments" (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1993) . Motivating self-investments is the key beneÞt of long-term contracting. I now turn to my contributions which deal with the costs.
My primary contribution is to identify the market-shielding cost of contracting. Consider what happens when Amex invests in market research and discovers a valuable IT innovation.
For instance, Amex planned a web-based expense reporting service for its corporate customers in 2003. To exploit this innovation, Amex needed an adapted IT service with new software and third-party web access. The long-term contract did not oblige IBM to provide the adapted system, since it was not included in the basic trade. So Amex had to adapt its contracts to exploit its investment, which I therefore deÞne as an "adaptation investment." Amex had two choices: either negotiate a deal with IBM or pay a competitor to make the changes.
Without the long-term contract, both alternatives would have been reasonable. Amex could have paid IBM to switch to providing the adapted service, or it could have stopped buying from IBM and negotiated provision of the adapted service from one of IBM's competitors, such as Electronic Data Systems (EDS). IBM may have sunk costs speciÞc to Amex, but in default of trade with IBM, Amex would credibly pay EDS to sink its avoidable start-up costs. Market forces -here Amex's threat of using EDS -therefore limit the price that IBM can charge for the adaptation. This ensures that Amex can earn a reasonable return on its investment.
Unfortunately, the long-term contract shields the relationship from these market forces:
Amex was unable to credibly threaten to buy the adapted service from EDS alongside the basic service from IBM. The adapted service would have mostly duplicated the basic service and its additional value (given Amex's limited service need) did not justify EDS's avoidable costs of substituting for IBM. 3 As a result, Amex depended on IBM to exploit its adaptation.
IBM was therefore able to hold up Amex by charging a high price for adaptation. Anticipating this holdup, Amex has less incentive to invest in adaptations.
Long-term contracts do not always cause holdup of adaptation investments, because side- 3 Breach of the long-term contract would avoid duplication of the basic service. Breach is common after mergers, but I follow Tirole (1990, page 54) in deÞning long-term contracts as those with breach penalties that enforce future performance. In 6.2, I generalize to stochastic breach.
trading (i.e. accessing market alternatives alongside the long-term contract) is sometimes feasible. For instance, had Amex been able to separate the adapted service into a basic service and an adaptation service, Amex might have turned to EDS for the adaptation alone as a side-trade complementing (instead of duplicatively substituting) the basic trade with IBM.
Amex's threat of buying from EDS alongside the contract with IBM would then protect Amex's investment from holdup.
The effectiveness of side-trading threats is highest when the adaptation and basic trades are least related, because separating provision of the basic and adaptation tasks between two providers (such as EDS and IBM) wastes any economies of scope. For instance, both tasks might require the same Þxed costs of learning about Amex. Also, separation may cause coordination and interference problems. For instance, IBM could refuse to provide user-support or third-party web access for software developed by EDS, or IBM could abuse its power as IT host to study EDS's proprietary code (see section 6). These are precisely the settings where practitioners warn of ßexibility problems (see section 2).
To formalize, I deÞne the "side-compatibility" of an adaptation investment with a long-term contract to be the fraction of investment returns that the investor (here the buyer, Amex) can dicts shorter contract durations for companies that buy from multiple vendors: the multiplicity of active suppliers suggests high competition, so investment speciÞcity and the resulting need for long-term contracting is low. (In proposition 5 below, I formally prove that optimal contract length is indeed increasing in speciÞcity.) However, the evidence from electronics outsourcing (López and Ventura, 2001 , and González and López, 2002) suggests that multi-sourcers tend, if anything, to use longer contracts. My theory helps to explain the puzzle: multi-sourcers can write longer contracts, because side-compatibility is high and this lowers the market-shielding cost of contracting.
To treat the second puzzle, I apply the concept of side-compatibility to adaptation investments by sellers (vendors). Suppose IBM develops a more secure IT service (e.g., by investing in asynchronous chip technology -see the Economist, 2001 ). IBM has a huge capacity so it could earn a market reward alongside the basic trade with Amex, by selling this adapted service to other buyers. However, for a smaller IT company, a long-term contract may limit side-compatibility by tying up most of the company's production capacity. Limited production capacity of the seller plays a role parallel to that of the buyer's limited consumption need (such as Amex's need for just one IT service).
Companies usually design their long-term contracts to employ only a fraction of their capacity, but economies of scale sometimes encourage a seller to dedicate most or all of its capacity to a single buyer. Side-compatibility is then very limited. This can resolve a second empirical puzzle. Kerkvliet and Shogren (2001) measure how far coal companies dedicate capacity to satisfying contracts with speciÞc clients. These scholars predicted that contract length would correlate positively with dedication since dedication is a standard proxy for relationship-speciÞcity, but they found that the most dedicated coal companies actually tend to write shorter contracts. The side-compatibility concept identiÞes a countervailing force that can explain their puzzling result: dedication lowers side-compatibility, thereby raising the cost of long-term contracting. Bercovitz (2000) uncovered the third empirical puzzle in data on franchising. Exclusive territories complement long-term performance contracts in protecting speciÞc investments by franchisees, so Bercovitz (2000) predicted a positive correlation, but she found the opposite.
The side-compatibility concept can explain this puzzle: contracts should be shorter when exclusivity is needed, because exclusivity clauses directly lower side-compatibility. To see why, notice that if Amex had committed to buy all its IT from IBM, it could never threaten to seek an IT adaptation from a third party. 5 5 Unsurprisingly, IT contracts often actively oppose exclusivity. E.g., M&I's contract with Tri City obliges M&I to cooperate with third-party providers, and GM's 10-year $32bn contract with EDS includes a "right to
To increase the relevance of my model, I generalize it in section 4 to capture two other major costs of long-term contracting. First, long-term contracts reduce incentives to make investments with positive contractual externalities. For instance, when IBM investments improve storage efficiency, Amex beneÞts since the pay-as-you-use formula in the long-term contract with IBM Þxes a price per unit of server space used. Unlike IBM's cost-cutting self-investment that raises IBM's own payoff, this is a "cross-investment" 6 by IBM because it beneÞts Amex (the other party). The long-term contract reduces IBM's incentive to improve storage efficiency, because it prevents Amex from punishing low efficiency with a termination threat (see Hoffman, 2002 , for evidence of this incentive cost). Second, long-term contracting can encourage wasteful self-investments. For instance, IBM might waste resources trying to hide low quality aspects of its service or litigating Amex (see CORI on EDS-Xerox, 1994). Similarly, long-term contracts can cause over-investment when a self-investment has negative cross-investment effects (e.g., lowering quality). My model shows that short-term contracting avoids all these problems, but introduces parallel problems for investments with "cross-general" effects (i.e., effects on other party's market payoffs).
The secondary contribution of this paper is to formulate a generic model of trade between two parties with multiple investments. My Þrst set of results characterizes how different investments respond to changes in contract length. I classify investments into two types.
Self-investments and cross-general investments are type 1 (contract-ophilic). They rise with contract length. Adaptation investments with limited side-compatibility and cross-investments are type 2 (contract-ophobic). They fall with contract length. I then use these results to determine how contract length optimally trades off investments based on their relative desirability.
My second set of results can be summarized as: optimal contract length increases with (1) the desirability of type 1 relative to type 2 investments; (2) the relationship-speciÞcity of type 1 investments; and (3) the side-compatibility of type 2 investments.
The rich literature on contract design in microeconomics (see Milgrom, 1991, or Salanié, 1997) tends to ignore a key factor: discoveries are made over time. I follow the "incomplete contracting approach" (see Hart, 1995) in emphasizing unanticipated discoveries, but my results do not require shifts in the residual rights of control. 7 My focus on the time dimension of contracting complements the literatures on damage measures (see Rogerson, 1984, and Shavell, 1984) and variable quantity contracts (see Edlin and Reichelstein, 1996) . In solicit bids" (CORI). 6 Che and Hausch (1999) call it "cooperative investment" but see Ellman (1999 and 2006) The literature on transaction costs (see Williamson, 1985) presents vital insights. Joskow's (1987) empirical support for the idea that contract length should increase with relationshipspeciÞcity (as proxied by limited competitive alternatives) has become a classic, and has been conÞrmed in several industries (see Masten and Saussier, 2002) . My propositions 4 and 5 formalize this idea. Furthermore, because uncertainty and complexity raise the importance of ongoing adaptations (and raise the risk that contracts motivate undesirable investments), my theory explains the growing evidence that these factors lead to shorter contracts. 9 Finally, my analysis reÞnes the transaction cost idea that long-term contracts can cause inßexibility, and suggests an explanation of ex post adaptation failure.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 solves it for optimal contract length. Section 4 introduces cross effects and wasteful investments. Section 5 extends the number of trading periods. Section 6 endogenizes side-compatibility through empirically motivated features of contract design, and applies the theoretical results to explain the empirical puzzles. Section 7 concludes.
Basic Model
This section introduces a simple model to analyze how advance commitment to an (imperfect)
formal contract affects the efficiency of a bilateral relationship embedded within a market. I denote the central actors by P for principal and A for agent; buyer-seller interpretations are also valid and I refer to all interactions as trades. Until section 5, I adopt a simpliÞed timing:
when P and A meet in stage 0 (February 2002 in Amex and IBM's case), they can negotiate an initial contract to govern stage 3 trade. In stage 1, P and A invest to raise trade surplus.
In stage 2, after observing their trade values, they Þnalize the contracts that will govern their joint and market trading in stage 3.
Contracting. Advance contracting is restricted by P and A's bounded ability to think up ways to enforce future trades. In stage 0, P and A can only choose between writing a "basic" performance contract, X, and writing a "null" contract, Φ (that does not enforce any stage 3 trade 10 ). During stage 1, they learn better ways to trade, so that by stage 2, they can choose a contract from the set {Φ, X, Z} where Z is the "adapted" contract that generates the highest surplus. Contracting is long-term when P and A commit at stage 0 to a performance contract (X) before investing. Contracting is short-term when instead they initially select the null contract Φ, leaving trade negotiation to the last minute (here, stage 2). (In the multi-period generalization in section 5, contract length is the amount of time over which the initial contract enforces basic trade performance.)
Payoffs. P and A's payoffs depend on their investments and on stage 3 trade contracts.
A typical investment, e j ∈ IR + by j ∈ {P, A}, imposes a private cost of e j on the investing party j and increases P and A's optimized stage 3 trade surplus (the surplus under Z) by
However, in default of renegotiation between P and A, e j only raises j's payoff under Φ by γ e j W j (e j ), and only raises j's payoff under X by ψ e j W j (e j ). In the default under Φ, there is no performance contract between P and A, so γ e j represents j's fractional return on e j after j switches to j's best alternative (market) trade. In the case of a speciÞc investment, γ e j < 1 because j's investment is then more effective in joint trading. Since γ e j = 0 for a fully speciÞc investment and γ e j = 1 for a fully general investment, I call γ e j the generality of e j . Meanwhile, in the default under X, j engages in the basic trade with −j (−j denotes A if j = P and P if j = A) and a side-trading response to X. So ψ e j represents j's fractional return on e j from both the basic trade induced by long-term contracting on X and the optimal side-trade; ψ e j effectively sums e j 's self-investment effect (direct compatibility with contract X) and e j 's side-compatibility (see introduction and deÞnition below).
Existing work assumes that ψ e j ≥ γ e j . This reßects how the long-term contract (X) may guarantee j a better investment return than afforded by market trading -ψ e j then reßects how well the contract X directly protects the investment. 11 However, the opposite case, ψ e j < γ e j , is also feasible. This occurs when the long-term contract X interferes with market access.
Consider an "adaptation investment," e j , deÞned as one needing an adapted contract (such as Z). By this deÞnition, e j generates no direct beneÞts under X, but in default of renegotiation with −j, j might still negotiate an adapted contract in the market. Accessing the market is usually more effective under Φ than under X, because enforcement of X tends to deplete j's capacity for market trading. As a result, the default returns on most adaptation investments 10 P and A may trade in stage 1, but I leave implicit the contract that enforces this trade. 11 This self-investment case occurs when a speciÞc investment, e j , is directly compatible with X by reducing j's cost of satisfying X (e.g., IBM coaching) and/or raising j's beneÞt from X (e.g., Amex learning to coordinate with IBM).
are greater under Φ (through switching trade partner) than under X (through side-trading).
For an adaptation investment, ψ e j represents the fractional returns on e j available through side-trading, so ψ e j measures its "side-compatibility". Since the case with ψ e j < γ e j is central When (under Φ) j switches to trade with −j 0 , −j 0 can provide the adapted trade to j using a technology which I denote by T 1 . In contrast to −j, −j 0 has not sunk any investments speciÞc to j, so technology T 1 involves additional Þxed costs F 1 and may involve higher marginal costs of adaptation (relative to the technology used by −j). So I assume j's value from this trade takes the form, v +γ 1 W j (e j ) − F 1 for some γ 1 ∈ (0, 1]. 12 I assume v > F 1 -the basic service is important enough to j to justify the avoidable Þxed cost F 1 . So, absent renegotiation under Φ, it is optimal (for all e j ) for j to switch to buying the adapted trade from −j 0 through T 1 .
Hence γ e j = γ 1 > 0.
When side-trading (under X), j's value from trade with technology T 1 is only γ 1 W j (e j )−F 1 , because j already has the basic service supplied by −j under X and j only has a demand for one basic service. (More generally, j's demand for the basic trade is limited, so trade under X depletes j's capacity for trade.) Assuming γ 1 W j (e j ) < F 1 for all e j (I generalize in the stochastic case below), it is never optimal to side-trade when T 1 is the only feasible technology.
So ψ e j = 0 < γ e j .
Sometimes, the adapted trade can be separated into the basic trade (enforced by X) and a complementary adaptation. In other words, −j 0 can provide an adaptation service using an alternative, cheaper technology T 2 with Þxed cost F 2 < F 1 . When the adaptation service is related to the basic service, there are economies of scope in having the same provider for both. 13 12 (1 − γ1) Wj (ej) represents the increase in implementation costs; see Section 4 on the possibility of γ1 > 1. 13 Note that agency problems can generate economies of scope: e.g., ψ e j is reduced if −j is able to interfere with −j 0 's activities under side-trading. Contractual terms that attempt to force −j to cooperate with other providers are notoriously hard to enforce (see Lacity and Willcocks, 1998) .
So T 2 is less efficient: it generates a value γ 2 W j (e j ) − F 2 with γ 2 < γ 1 and
therefore remains optimal when j switches supplier, but assuming
for all e j , T 2 's lower Þxed cost is attractive when j engages in side-trading. In default of renegotiation, j and −j 0 would use T 1 under Φ and T 2 under X. So γ e j = γ 1 (as before)
and ψ e j rises to γ 2 . So separability raises ψ e j but ψ e j remains below γ e j , because j's limited demand dissuades j from exploiting economies of scope (via technology T 1 ) when side-trading.
The result that γ e j > ψ e j for adaptation investments is common to many generalizations of the trading technology, but the size of the difference γ e j − ψ e j depends on contractual and organizational design (as well as technological separability and economies of scope). Endogeneity of γ e j − ψ e j is important for the empirics of section 6. First, even when separation is technologically feasible, ψ e j can be reduced to 0 by contractual terms, such as exclusivity restrictions included in X, that directly prevent j from buying services from alternative sellers. Second, consider organization j's choice between buying from one or multiple sellers. If j divides provision of the basic trade between −j and −j 0 in stage 0 (e.g., through a pair of long-term contracts) then both −j and −j 0 must sink Þxed costs speciÞc to j of F 0 and F 0 0 , respectively. This wastes the scope economy F 0 0 from using a single supplier and the gains from task specialization between the suppliers may be low. On the other hand, when j makes adaptation investments, each of the two original suppliers has access to economies of scope in providing the adaptation. So the suppliers compete to provide j's adaptations. This raises the buyer's side-compatibility ψ e j . (See 6.3 and 6.5 for further analysis endogenizing these contract design and sourcing choices.)
Practitioners have long sought to predict where long-term contracting is likely to inhibit adaptation. It is therefore encouraging to Þnd a direct link between my characterization and their practical advice. Practitioners distinguish adaptations that are 'substitute' trades from those that require 'related or unrelated, additional' trades. Their substitutes case corresponds to my case of non-separability (T 2 is infeasible or does not exist) in which ψ e j is usually zero. Their additional trades case corresponds to the case of separability. Also, the more the additional trade is related to the basic trade, the greater are the economies of scope in having the same provider for both. So ψ e j is greater in these cases. By showing that contractual ßexibility increases with side-compatibility ψ e j , my theory provides a foundation for the practitioner claims that contractual ßexibility is lowest for adaptations requiring substitute trade and highest for adaptations that are additional and unrelated.
The case of adaptations by a seller is very similar to adaptations by a buyer: limited capacity for service production replaces limited service need as the constraint on side-trading.
An exact parallel to the above buyer examples is feasible, but I treat the more common case where sellers can sell multiple basic or adapted trades. So when an adaptation is discovered, the seller wants to convert all its basic trades into adapted trades. If the seller j's longterm contracts demand a fraction d of capacity and if adapted and basic services are equally demanding on trade capacity, 14 then side-trading only permits j to exploit a fraction 1 − d of the feasible adaptation return. Hence, ψ e j = 1−d, whereas short-term contracting -equivalent to d = 0 -gives γ e j = 1 > ψ e j . I endogenize the capacity dedication choice, d, in the second empirical puzzle of section 6 (6.4).
Investment returns are often stochastic. Suppose T 1 is the only feasible technology and the adaptation value is W j (e j )+y where y is a random variable. The expected default return on e j under Φ is then W j (e j ) Pr (v + W j (e j ) + y − F 1 > 0) while the default return from side-trading
greater than ψ e j = Pr(W j (e j ) + y − F 1 > 0). When y can be large (e.g., if the buyer acquires another Þrm; see Lacity and Willcocks, 1998), both γ e j and ψ e j may be strictly increasing in e j . This complicates the mathematics in optimizing contract length, but reiterates the paper's basic insight: contracts have a market-shielding effect that reduces adaptation incentives.
Investment categories. I categorize investments into two groups. An investment e j is type 1 (or contract-ophilic) if ψ e j > γ e j and is type 2 (or contract-ophobic) if ψ e j < γ e j .
(See section 4 for an extension.) This categorization generalizes the introductory distinction between investments for which the contract's protection effect dominates, or (respectively) is dominated by, its market-shielding effects. A self-investment (e.g., IBM's speciÞc investment in cost-cutting that is protected by contract X) is a typical type 1 investment. An adaptation investment that is general but has limited side-compatibility (e.g., Amex's market research) is a typical type 2 investment.
In the model, each investor makes one investment of each type. (It is straightforward to generalize to any number of investments.) I denote j's type 1 and type 2 investments by e j and i j , respectively. These investments generate additively separable returns W j (e j ) and V j (i j ) which I assume satisfy the standard concavity, monotonicity and Inada boundary conditions (guaranteeing interior investment choices).
14 Adaptation might need additional capacity, e.g., j might have just enough capacity to sell the basic service and one adaptation service. Then j can sell an adaptation service to −j 0 alongside selling the basic service to −j, but this forfeits the economies of scope. So ψe j > 0 but remains less than γe j .
For sections 2 and 3 only, I also restrict the parameters γ and ψ to the unit interval, [0, 1].
In the base case, all payoffs are additively separable in costs, beneÞts and transfers across time. P and A are risk-neutral 15 and face no wealth constraints. Investment costs and trade payoffs are in money metric units and I normalize to the case with no time-discounting. So P and A's overall objectives are given by the utility functions, U j ≡ u j − e j − i j + T j where u j denotes the stage 3 trade payoffs and T j is the net additional transfer from −j to j, 16
Renegotiation. P and A always have symmetric information and I assume that stage 3 renegotiation leads to a Þxed and equal split of any negotiation surplus over the default outcome determined by P and A's stage 0 contract; see section 4 for a generalization. I sketch the timing for this section in Figure 1 . The Þrst-best. In the Þrst-best, P and A can Þx e and i cooperatively at stage 0. In stage 3, the trade surplus is u P + u A = P j=P,A (W j (e j ) + V j (i j )). So in stage 0, they choose e and i to maximize their total surplus, 17
Assumption 1 ensures that the Þrst order conditions are both necessary and sufficient, and 15 I follow Goldberg and Erickson (1987) in ignoring risk. Recent evidence suggests risk-sharing often plays a limited role in contract design even in the classic case of small farmers (see Lueck, 1995, 1999) . 16 All statements hold "for j = P, A."
give unique solutions to the Þrst-best which I denote with a superscript * ,
In the second-best equilibrium, P and A choose e and i non-cooperatively, because these investments, their costs, and their resulting payoffs u, are all non-veriÞable (e.g., outsiders
cannot measure the quality or cost of IBM's coaching investments). I therefore compare the 
Equilibrium with long-term contracting
When P and A agree on X at stage 0, their default payoffs in stage 2 renegotiation are given by
The total gain available on renegotiation is therefore,
P and A each get their default payoffs plus half of these renegotiation gains, so after making investments e and i, their expected payoffs from stage 2 onwards are given by,
where
. I solve for the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium using backward induction. Party j invests to maximize this expected return less its investment cost, e j + i j . Since K (·) is independent of e j and i j , j's problem is,
The Þrst order conditions are again necessary and sufficient,
When ψ = 1, these conditions replicate equation (1) and give the Þrst-best, but for ψ < 1, the concavity of W and V implies underinvestment. Investor j's investments increase with j's share of default returns, which increase with the compatibility parameters, ψ e j and ψ i j ; long-term contracting protects investments to the extent that they are directly compatible or side-compatible with the contract. The general intuition is familiar: a higher investment return in the default outcome reduces dependence on negotiating with the speciÞc trading partner.
The investor therefore loses a smaller share of investment returns in renegotiation, and better internalizes the investment. 
Equilibrium with short-term contracting
When P and A choose Φ at stage 0, their stage 2 default payoffs are given by the expression,
. By analogy with the long-term contracting case, the Þrst order conditions are,
Investments now increase with γ instead of ψ, and there is underinvestment when γ < 1. In words, short-term contracting allows market forces to motivate investments to the extent that they are general, but (by the classic holdup problem) speciÞcity causes underinvestment. 18 
Equilibrium with intermediate contract length
In Section 5, contracts can extend over multiple trading periods, but even in the basic model, I can treat contract length as a continuous variable by allowing for stochastic enforcement. I 18 The intuition again follows from asking whether an investor can appropriate investment returns without having to renegotiate. Under short-term contracting, the default returns are determined by the investor's market alternatives reßected in γ. The problem is that market forces do not motivate speciÞc investments.
let α denote the probability that X is enforced (in default of renegotiation). With converse probability 1 − α, P and A's default contract is Φ. I assume that P and A can choose any α ∈ [0, 1] at stage 0 -for instance, by varying contractual ambiguity 19 or breach damages (see 6.2) . This generalizes the above analysis because α = 0 corresponds to short-term contracting (ST C) and α = 1 corresponds to long-term contracting (LT C). I refer to α as contract length -the contract enforces trade for on average α·G time units where G, the time elapsing between stages 0 and 3, is the common gestation period of the investments. The interpretation of α as a deterministic contract length is validated in the multi-period model of section 5.
The default payoffs are now convex combinations of those from X and Φ with weights, α and 1 − α, respectively. The Þrst-order conditions are therefore,
This set of equations allows me to generalize the Þrst two propositions and show how contract length affects investment incentives as a function of the sign and size of ψ − γ. Raising α shifts weight from γ onto ψ. This raises H ≡ 1 + α · ψ + (1 − α) γ when ψ > γ, and lowers it when ψ < γ. Equations (2) then imply that increasing α increases W 0 j (e j ) and decreases V 0 j (i j ), so e j rises and i j falls (as W and V are concave). 
This captures the key tradeoff between increasing contract length to protect type 1 investments and reducing contract length so that market forces can better motivate type 2 investments.
Type 1 investments, e P and e A , are speciÞc but contract-compatible (γ < ψ) so the contract protects them better than do market forces. Type 2 investments, i P and i A , are general and contract-incompatible (γ > ψ) so for them, market forces are better than the long-term contract (with its side-compatible market forces). In the next section, I predict contract length by trading off contractual protection of e against its cost in shielding out contract-incompatible market forces that reward i.
19 I can redeÞne α to be P and A's prior estimate of whether stage 3 trade will be induced.
Optimal Contract Length in the Basic Model
P and A choose contract length at stage 0. In this section, I show how optimal length is determined by the relative importance of different investments and the effectiveness and compatibility of contracts and market forces. In stage 0 negotiations, P and A can use up-front transfers to share any gains from a surplus increasing contract. So they choose α to maximize their total surplus, subject (unlike in the Þrst-best) to the "incentive compatibility" conditions (2) on e and i. I denote the unique solutions of (2) by e j = e j (α) and i j = i j (α). So P and A's problem is,
Propositions 1-3 show that underinvestment is the only efficiency problem in the basic model. Proposition 3 also shows how to motivate more investment: increase α to improve type 1 investments, e, and decrease α to improve type 2 investments, i. Intuition therefore suggests that α should increase with the importance of e P and e A relative to i P and i A . To investigate formally, I scale up the payoff impact of investments e j , i j by the importance parameters, E j ,
replace e j and W j (e j ) by E j e j and E j · W j (e j ) and I replace i j and V j (i j ) by
Notice that this rescaling does not change the Þrst-order conditions for e and i, but it does change the importance of having e and i close to their Þrst-best levels (because the surplus loss from underinvestment is increasing in E and I, respectively). The intuitive idea follows from solving P and A's rescaled problem,
Proposition 4a. Assuming the maximand of (4a) is concave (see appendix for sufficient conditions), the optimal contract length increases with the importance of investments of type 1, and decreases with importance of type 2's: α (E, I) has readily explains why almost all the longer IT contracts (those over 5 years long) occur in these "merger and acquisition" type deals.
An alternative comparative static exercise is to vary the productivity of an investment, so that e j generates a returnÊ j ·W j (e j ) and similarly for i j with productivity parameterÎ j . This changes the Þrst-order conditions to,
P and A's problem is now,
where e j ³ α,Ê j´a nd i j ³ α,Î j´s olve incentive compatibility conditions (5) . Notice that the productivity parameters raise incentives to invest for Þxed α (i.e., ∂e j (α,Êj)
This effect countervails against the need to use α to further raise incentives (to exploit the productivity as in the intuition), so a clear result in this case requires a regularity condition (familiar from insurance contracting 20 ),
Proposition 4b. Under assumption 3 (and the regularity condition of Proposition 4a), the optimal contract length increases with the productivity of investments of type 1, and decreases with productivity of type 2 investments: α
The effectiveness of markets and contracts (captured by γ and ψ) also affects optimal contract length. There are two types of effect for any given investment. First, if ψ and 20 There is no precautionary saving interpretation here, but consider the sharp countervailing effect of a Þxed cost self-investment: when the investment's importance generates incentives exceeding the Þxed cost, α can be decreased. Assumptions 1 and 3 rule out generalized versions of this problem.
γ change so that δ ≡ ψ − γ rises while H (α; ψ, γ) ≡ 1 + α · ψ + (1 − α) γ is Þxed, longterm contracting becomes more effective relative to the market forces freed by short-term contracting. This intuitively favors the use of longer contracts and should increase α. I call this a substitution effect, because P and A substitute market forces for contract length according to their relative effectiveness as investment motivators. Second, an increase in γ or ψ directly raises the investment level for any given α. This level effect is determined by changes in H (α)
for Þxed α and δ. The level effect reduces the need to adjust α in favour of the investment, so the level effect on α is negative for type 1 investments and positive for type 2 investments. 
Changes that increase H (α; ψ, γ) have a "level" effect that is negative for type 1, but positive for type 2, investments:
I use two direct corollaries in section 6. First, contract length rises with ψ for type 2 investments, so raising side-compatibility of an adaptation investment raises optimal contract length. 21 Given that side-compatibility tends to be higher in multi-sourcing, this generates a tendency for longer contracts in multi-vendor situations. Second, contract length rises when market alternatives fall, because this makes investments more speciÞc, i.e., γ falls. This claim, famously supported by Joskow (1987) and others, is clearly valid for type 1 investments. My model shows that there is a complication, because the level effect when type 2 investments become more speciÞc could motivate shorter contracts. However, the substitution effects are positive for all investments, so this effect will only dominate in special cases. Furthermore, some investments could switch from type 2 to type 1, raising the relative importance of type 1 investments and inducing longer contracts by proposition 4.
Cross Effects, Waste and Bargaining Asymmetry
This section extends the model to allow for investment externalities, wasteful investment and bargaining asymmetries. A cross effect is an investment externality that occurs under the basic contract X: the basic contract induces a (non-contractible) quality of trade that depends on prior investment by the trading partner. 22 Cross effects may be negative. IBM's private return on a negative cross-investment exceeds the social return, so I allow for ψ > 1. This case also occurs for speciÞc investments if separate trading is sometimes optimal.
Similarly, γ > 1 when investments (e.g., in advertising or search) generate alternatives that are mostly used as threat points. To allow for pure threat point investments, I even consider investments that are entirely wasteful in that their social return is zero. (Such threats -e.g.
to exploit a contractual loophole -are never implemented in equilibrium.)
To extend the model, I now allow j's investment, e j to raise −j's payoff by ψ cross
under X (the cross effect), and by γ cross e j · W j (e j ) under Φ (the cross-general effect). I also allow e j to be a wasteful investment by removing the additive W j (e j ) term from the trade surplus under Z. 24 Similarly, for i j . The impact of j's positive cross effects is to reduce j's payoff from renegotiation, because −j's default payoff is increased. The Þrst order conditions A pure cross-investment is one for which ψ cross > 0, while the other parameters are zero. This is a type 2 investment becauseδ = −ψ cross < 0. So cross-investments fall with contract length α even though there cannot be any market-shielding if γ = 0. Instead, the longterm contract is costly (as in Che and Hausch, 1999) , because it increases the investment's cross-effect on IBM (see also 6.1). 23 Similarly, suppliers may learn from their buyers. E.g., Solectron learned how to make own-brand products after working for IBM, HP and Mitsubishi (see Arruñada and Vazquez, 2004 , and Lee and Hoyt, 2001 ). 24 If ej actually reduces this social return, the effects are simply more pronounced.
externality and therefore lowers the investor's incentive. A corollary of the extended version of proposition 4 is that contracts should become shorter as cross-investments become more important. 25 A pure cross-general investment is one for which only γ cross > 0. This is a type 1 investment sinceδ = γ cross > 0, so it rises with α. The contract helps because it shields out the market externality. The extension of proposition 4 predicts longer contracts when cross-general effects are important. A contract imposing exclusivity alone may (if legal) be more effective in preventing cross-general externalities (see Segal and Whinston, 2000) , but performance contracting is often preferable since this also motivates self-investments and side-compatible adaptations.
Asymmetries in bargaining do not change the nature of these effects, but they do change the relative importance of cross and self effects, because self effects lead to a beneÞt without need for bargaining power, while cross effects only matter through traders' renegotiation shares. If j now wins a share θ j ∈ [0, 1] of the renegotiation returns, j's incentive conditions are as in (5) except that (a)ψ andγ replaced by ψ (θ) When an investment is wasteful, the impact of contract length is determined by its parametersψ andγ exactly as for productive investments apart from the level effect implicit in replacing the factor H by H − 1 (H − 2θ in the general case). However, the maximand (3) only includes the subtraction of the investment cost, since it has no social return. So P and A aim to minimize the cost, and the message of proposition 4 is exactly inverted. I Þrst prove this in proposition 6a by varying the importance (scale), K j , of a wasteful investment, k j that costs K j k j and generates private returns K j · B j (k j ) where B j (·) satisÞes the above regularity conditions. Then in proposition 6b, I prove the same result holds for increases in the productivityK j of a wasteful investment k j , that costs k j and generates private returns ofK j B j (k j ).
This second result requires that B j (·) satisfy assumption 3, because of the countervailing effect described in proposition 4b above. (Interestingly, assumption 3 is also a sufficient condition 25 There is one complication. Intermediate breach penalties might allow the non-investing trader to credibly threaten termination after low cross-investment. Che and Hausch (1999) argue that such option schemes do not work (given renegotiation), because the trader would threaten to terminate even after high cross-investment. Ellman (2006) shows that, absent reputational mechanisms, this critique is invalid when options are decided by a trading decision (see also Watson, 2005) . However, option schemes have α < 1 in generic stochastic settings, so there is still a tendency towards shorter contracts. . So, for high α, changing the productivity (importance) of this investment has the same effect as if the investment were wasteful, while for low α, the implications are as in proposition 4. Similarly, whenγ > 1, there is a risk of over-investment for low values of α. 26 In conclusion, the impact of cross effects (ψ cross and γ cross ) is the inverse of the corresponding self effects (ψ and γ) and the impact of importance on contract length is inverted for an investment that is wasteful or excessive. When traders are inexperienced or uncertainty and complexity are high, it is harder to write contracts that pin down quality, so there is a greater risk of cross effects. This section helps explain why contracts are often short in such settings: contract length is reduced to better motivate cross-investments and to reduce over-investment in investments with negative cross effects. (A complementary effect of uncertainty is to increase the importance of adaptations. This can also explain the shorter contracts observed.)
Temporal Extension
This section analyzes multi-period extensions of the trading model. Stage 3 trading is spread over time 27 and subdivided into N discrete trade decisions, each lasting l units of time. A simple long-term contract enforcing trade in the Þrst m ≤ N substages has length L = m·l +G (where 26 To complete the generalization,ψ andγ might also be negative, but this has no special effect other than possible corner solutions at zero investment. 27 Trade is often spread over time because production is time-intensive, being limited by capacity and proce- 
In the case of a time invariant technology, the summations in (6) simplify to In the multi-period extension with time invariance, restricting to simple long-term contracts has no efficiency cost and propositions 1-6 all hold with L replacing α. 28 Renegotiation and interdependence among the αn could create history-dependence inside the subgame, but the game with independent αn and renegotiation restricted to only adjusting the contract for the upcoming trading period has the same equilibria.
Time-invariance is a special case. Allowing for variation in the productivity parameters E and I over time n permits further predictions. First, if self-investments become redundant over time and/or adaptation investments become more important over time, simple contracts are uniquely optimal. The intuition is that simple contracts exploit contractual protection where most effective and least harmful (in terms of market-shielding), because they crowd trade enforcement into the earliest substages where E j,n is large relative to I j,n . 29 Second, one can study varying gestation periods, by setting G = 0 and deÞning G e j = l · max {n : E j,n = 0∀m ≤ n} (and G i j similarly). Two implications are immediate. If contract length L > 0, then L should exceed min j G e j , because otherwise the contract has no protection beneÞt. 30 This may help explain why agriculture contracts are longer in the case of fruit trees as shown in Bandiera's (2002) historical data. However, when G e j gets too large, the market-shielding cost may be prohibitive and L will fall back, as traders abandon the idea of protecting e j . Further implications, depend on the time proÞles of investment productivity and can be analyzed using the extended model.
A pair of arguably stronger reasons for the prevalence of simple contracts derive from plausible history dependence within the trade interval. Unless a contract is simple, it must involve at least one 'performance gap' during which the contract does not enforce joint trade. Switching to an alternative trade during such a gap is often not credible, because the trader would anticipate having to pay Þxed costs of switching back to joint trade after the gap (in addition to Þxed costs of switching to the alternative trade). 31 This implies market-shielding even during the contractual gap, so there is no cost from Þlling in the gap with performance. Even when switching is credible during a gap (that is long enough to justify the Þxed costs of switching) switching to an alternative partner for the main trade can reduce the marginal value of speciÞc investments when returning to joint trade. For instance, switching may require reorganizations that interfere with the speciÞc investments. This reduces the effectiveness (investment protection) of imposing performance after the gap. With these endogenous parameter shifts, avoiding performance gaps through simple contracts is optimal since it maximizes contract 29 The general condition for unique optimality of simple contracts is that the importance of type 1 investments grow at a lower rate than for type 2's -i.e., ε n ≡Ê j,n+1
, ∀n, ∀j. The proof is simple when γ and ψ are independent of n: The summation terms in the Þrst-order conditions become η > 0 and increasing αn by ιn · η Þxes the incentive on all type 2 investments and increases the incentives for all type 1 investments by (ι n − ε n ) η 2 δ > 0. Henceα n < 1 ⇒α n+1 = 0 ∀n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. Gaps are always avoided. 30 If minj Gi j > 0 then there is no market-shielding cost for L ∈ [0, minj Gi j ) so the precise claim is that L should exceed minj Ge j , if L > minj Gi j .
31 For side-compatible adaptations, alternative trade credibility is in fact higher during performance contracting.
protection relative to market-shielding. 32 My model could be extended in two directions. 34 For ever-green contracts, the length of the advance notice period is the key proxy, but the size of the penalty on giving notice is particularly important as the effective length is inÞnite if this penalty is too high. 35 This statement applies with opposite signs for cross compatibility.
extremely brief but intense contract could conceivably limit this market-shielding problem, but there is a major risk that such a contract would simply encourage wasteful investments that are only useful for producing at artiÞcially high intensity.
Second, the long-term contract might include a trade menu from which at least one party (usually the client) can choose after investing. For instance, in IBM and Amex's "pay-as-youuse" contract, Amex owes less to IBM if it uses less server space. This raises side-compatibility for any Amex adaptation that affects its server space needs. However, ßexibility must be limited to protect the seller's speciÞc investments. Pricing is generally non-linear. For instance, the lion's share of Amex's service charge is effectively Þxed. 36 Third, the contractual menu might be determined over time through a set of modiÞcation procedures. Indeed, a large share of vendor compensation in the long-term contracts supporting Cost-plus contracts can be viewed as a menu contract in which they buyer can demand adaptations on the condition of paying the additional costs required by adaptation. When containing a minimal trade guarantee, such a contract is very similar to the revenue commitment contract. In ideal circumstances, this again resolves the holdup problems analyzed above. 36 Koch (2003) criticizes IBM's exaggeration in claiming to have invented a fully ßexible "e-business utility" model. Goldberg and Erickson (1987) is a classic reference on non-linearity in long-term contracting. 37 Arbitrators may require demonstration of market alternatives when seeking benchmark prices. The credibility of side-trading then affects the benchmarked price Þxed by this "market test." See e.g., additional services and market tests in GM-EDS's $40bn contract. 38 Relatedly, some contracts Þx an annual limit on "system enhancements" that the client can demand at a predetermined total price, but again the arbitrator's ignorance may lead to over-estimates of the work hours required for a given enhancement. Flexibility is further limited when the client exceeds the 'total work hours' as occurred to the UK Inland Revenue-Accenture contract after legislators introduced "stakeholder pensions"
in 1998 and quarterly tax reporting for corporations in 1999 (see NAO, 2001 ).
However, the problem is as before: measuring adaptation costs is often too difficult. 39 
Contract Enforcement and Breach Damages
As just noted, the principal contract enforcement problem underlying my main result is the non-veriÞability of adaptation costs. Since veriÞability is also a problem for informal enforcement mechanisms involving third parties, my results continue to apply in settings where trade agreements are enforced by group or market reputations. However, if the trading relationship were governed by bilateral self-enforcement (also called relational contracting), these informational constraints would be avoided. Unfortunately, in settings where large speciÞc investments are sunk at the start of the relationship and pay off over a period of many years, repetition within the same relationship is unlikely. So self-enforcement of these investments is not usually feasible. By contrast, adaptation investments and returns are often more frequently repeated, so reputational mechanisms should favour longer contracts. 40 My sharp non-veriÞability assumptions also ruled out more subtle breach penalties such as reliance and expectation damage measures as alternatives to liquidated damages. Relaxing these assumptions reduces the difficulty of motivating investments, but with imperfect measurement of the potential costs and beneÞts from adaptation, market forces and side-compatibility In terms of the model, the moderate breach penalties 39 My strict assumption that costs are non-veriÞable rules out cost-plus contracting, but in settings where many similar traders could gain from long-term contracting and good incentives to adapt, the traders might pay to create a specialist agency that would build a capability and reputation for verifying adaptation costs.
In these settings, contracts could be longer without suffering from serious rigidities. (Of course, if the agency could also verify investments, long-term contracts would not be needed either.) 40 SpeciÞc assumptions about renegotiation are also important. For instance, they determine whether long- raised side-compatibility without an excessive fall in protection of self-investments. In general, it is optimal to make breach credible in states where the marginal returns to adaptation investments are maximal, thereby exploiting market forces at their most powerful. Intermediate breach damages therefore dominate stochastic enforcement with high breach penalties, whenever the marginal and absolute returns on adaptations are positively correlated. 41 
Multiple Vendors
In empirical result, but to be thorough, I need to endogenize the sourcing decision. I do so now for a single buyer with two potential sellers.
I build on the simple technological setup described in the italicized derivation of sidecompatibility from section 2: I allow for exogenous variation in the size of the Þxed startup costs and in the investment importance parameters, I and E. Each of the two potential suppliers faces the same Þxed cost F of servicing the buyer's speciÞc needs. So dual sourcing wastes a possible scope economy worth F . This may be partially compensated by specialization gains, S. So the technological advantage of single sourcing is F − S. 44 Now for single sourcing, the supplier that is not selected in advance can still avoid sinking its Þxed cost when an adapted service is discovered, so given F > γW (e), this supplier will not credibly compete for providing the adapted service and ψ = 0 < γ. I begin with the simple case where F or S varies for some exogenous technological reason.
An increase in F − S directly raises the probability of single sourcing and therefore (by reducing side-compatibility) lowers the expected contract length α. Variation in F − S therefore 44 Positive F − S is trivial: dual sourcing is then technologically and strategically (for investment incentives)
optimal. 45 This neglects the possibility of multiple trade technologies, but the analysis readily generalizes since the Þxed cost sunk under dual sourcing generally induces a more efficient side-trading technology. 46 Economies of scope in variable costs would imply γ dual > ψ dual , but −δ is still generally greater under single sourcing, because the added problem of the Þxed costs is greater relative to an isolated side trade. 47 Dual sourcing could reduce speciÞcity of speciÞc investments where speciÞcity is caused by Þxed costs. Such an effect would only reinforce the empirical puzzle.
generates a negative correlation between single sourcing and contract length, offering a clear and simple resolution of the empirical puzzle.
Now I analyze the case where variations in sourcing strategies are driven by variations in the importance (I and E) of adaptation and speciÞc investments. Consider increasing the importance E of speciÞc investments. By proposition 4a, it is optimal to raise contract length α, but when the distortion in adaptation incentives gets high enough (I not too small), it becomes optimal to shift to dual sourcing. Dual sourcing favours adaptation investments, so this shift is accompanied by an upwards jump in α. Further increases in E again lead to further increases in α. It follows immediately that dual sourcing is associated with longer contracts (greater α).
Variations in the importance of adaptation investments have a less monotonic effect. When I is very low, it is optimal to focus on protecting speciÞc investments with a long-term contract and dual-sourcing is suboptimal (in the non-trivial case where F − S > 0). As I rises, α should fall, except at the point (for large enough E) where I is large enough to justify a shift to dual sourcing. At this point, α jumps upwards, before continuing to fall with I. The comparison between the average contract lengths associated with dual and single sourcing therefore depends on the exact density distribution of I. So the prediction here is ambiguous.
My principal contribution is to show that dual sourcing can (and often but not always, will) favour long-term contracting and to identify conditions favouring this outcome.
To extend the relevance of this section to applied work, it is also important to recognize that the side-compatibility advantage of multi-sourcing can sometimes be achieved through "selective outsourcing," whereby a client retains a strong internal IT unit. Indeed, Amex chose this approach. Its internal IT unit credibly competes with IBM to satisfy some of its adaptation needs, so Amex's side-compatibility is not so low. See Lacity et al., (1996) for evidence suggesting that selective outsourcing, like multi-sourcing, increases ßexibility.
Multiple Clients and Dedication
Transaction cost theorists have thoroughly analyzed the contracts between coal processors and electric utilities. Expanding on Joskow's (1987) classic approach, Kerkvliet and Shogren (2001) measured the fraction of capacity each coal company dedicates to the contract for supplying coal with its utility partner. They were surprised to Þnd a signiÞcant negative correlation between this measure of dedication and contract length. This Þnding (which is robust to four explanation attempts performed by Kerkvliet and Shogren, 2001 ) is indeed anomalous given that high dedication plausibly proxies for relationship-speciÞcity which tends to require longer contracts.
The side-compatibility perspective offers a simple explanation. 48 available capacity, subtracting prior contractual commitments, so a follow-up study might well Þnd that high dedication is not a good proxy for having only one client in their dataset.) 49 Also, uncertainty in electricity demand is greater over longer time horizons, so risk averse utilities may prefer to buy coal in shorter term contracts as a way to share demand risk with coal producers. Again, contract dedication would covary negatively to counterbalance length reductions.
set. The puzzle is that she Þnds no signiÞcant correlation. The side-compatibility perspective offers a simple resolution. Exclusivity clauses reduce the side-compatibility of franchisor investments that require local adaptations, and this makes contract length more costly. Franchise contracts do not always need exclusivity to complement them and (by proposition 5)
contracts will be longer in these cases. For instance, in low density markets, the franchisor cannot credibly threaten to hold up the franchisee by setting up a new franchise or company unit nearby, so exclusive territories are not needed. Holdup is adequately prevented by the long-term franchise contract Þxing royalty rate and fees. However, in denser local markets, exclusivity territories are needed to complement the long-term contract; incentives for franchisor adaptations are then at risk and contracts should be shorter. 50 This offers a reasonable explanation for the negative correlation.
Interestingly, Bercovitz (2000) also Þnds an insigniÞcant correlation between exclusivity and her proxy for speciÞcity (franchisor estimates of franchisee set-up costs). Measurement error might explain the insigniÞcant correlation, but the proxy speciÞcity has been successful in other work -see Dnes (1992) side-compatibility to analyze how to assign ownership rights when some investments are partly asset-speciÞc.
Concluding Discussion
I have analyzed the optimal duration of performance contracting in a bilateral model where both traders make multiple investments. My most important result is that contracts should be shorter when side-compatibility is low and it is important to motivate adaptation investments.
By showing that side-compatibility is high in three relevant settings (when a trader has multiple vendors, when long-term contracts do not exhaust the capacity or need for trade, and when there are no exclusivity clauses restricting side-trades), I was able to apply this result to predict a pressure towards longer contracts and resolve the three empirical puzzles from the transaction cost literature.
My market-shielding perspective endogenizes and qualiÞes the transaction cost idea that Þxed-price contracting, since these settings limit the inßexibility concern.
In conclusion, the resolution of the three puzzles and the consistency with the evidence from the transaction cost literature on contract length offers encouraging support for my simple model. Nonetheless, it is vital to now collect empirical data with an eye to creating effective proxies of side-compatibility and the other parameters used to predict contract length. This will permit sharper tests of the model's predictions and improve our ability to explain the design and duration of contracts. , since H e j ≡ ³ 1 + γ e j + αδ e j´a nd D e j depends on α through H e j . Now ∂D e j ∂α < 0, so this level effect has the same sign as −δ e j . The same argument applies for i j .
Proof of Propositions 6a and 6b. The maximand (4) Similarly, dα dK j takes the same sign as, 
